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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brandon Jack Timpson appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief. He submits that the district court erred when it dismissed
his petition.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 31, 2015, Mr. Timpson pleaded guilty to one count of robbery and one count
of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.5, 85.) For the respective counts, the district
court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years, with six years fixed, and seven years,
with two years fixed. (R., pp.5-6, 85.) Mr. Timpson appealed from the judgment of conviction,
but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentences.1 (R., pp.6,
85; State v. Timpson, Docket Nos. 43781 & 42782 (Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2016) (unpublished).)
Subsequently, Mr. Timpson filed a petition for review, but it was denied on August 16, 2016.
(R., p.6.)
On December 27, 2016, Mr. Timpson filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp.5-17.) The petition raised three claims. First, Mr. Timpson alleged a Miranda2 violation
occurred during his interrogation. (R., pp.6-7.) Second, he alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to seek suppression of his statements arising out of the Miranda violation.

1

Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Timpson has filed a motion for this Court to take
judicial notice of the direct appeal record and the 2015 Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI).
As there was a third count in a separate case — Ada County Case No. CR 2014-12447 — it was
a consolidated appeal. However, the 2014 case is not at issue in this post-conviction appeal, only
the 2015 case — Ada County Case No. CR 2015-6576. Two PSIs were prepared for the
respective cases, but any citations to the PSI here refer to the 2015 PSI — the 444-page
electronic document.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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(R., pp.7-8.) And third, he alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 motion seeking leniency as he requested. (R., pp.8-9.) Regarding the failure
to file a Rule 35 motion, Mr. Timpson stated that he told his attorney he wanted to file the
motion, and emailed his attorney the information he requested, but his attorney never filed the
motion. (R., pp.8-9.) The district court granted Mr. Timpson’s motion for the appointment of
counsel, and his motion to release the Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI) to counsel.
(R., pp.35, 42.)
Subsequently, the State filed its answer, which stated, “Respondent denies all claims
contained in Timpson's petition.” (R., pp.42-43.) On the same day, the State filed a motion for
summary disposition and a brief in support of the motion. (R., pp.56, 45-54.) The brief
characterized Mr. Timpsons’s petition as asserting two claims: an ineffective assistance claim for
failing to file a suppression motion, and an ineffective assistance claim for failing to file a Rule
35 motion.

(R., pp.51-54.)

With respect to the first claim, the State argued that it was

inadequately pled because Mr. Timpson failed to allege what he said during interrogation and
failed to allege prejudice, i.e., how his counsel’s decision not to file the motion affected his
decision to plead guilty. (R., pp.51-52.) With respect to the second issue, the State argued that
Mr. Timpson failed to produce new or additional information, and thus there was no basis to hold
that the motion would have been granted if counsel had filed it. (R., pp.53-54.) The district
court granted Mr. Timpson leave to file an amended petition, and an amended verified petition
was filed on April 6, 2017. (R., pp.61-65.)
The amended petition alleged the same claims but largely focused on the suppression
claim. (R., pp.63-64.) It also alleged there was new information to support a Rule 35 motion
that was given to defense counsel’s investigator, but the motion was never filed. (R., p.64.)
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Subsequently, the district court took judicial notice of the record from the criminal case, and
issued a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.67-79.) Regarding the first issue, the district court
wrote that Mr. Timpson’s requests for counsel during the interrogation were not clear and
unequivocal, so there was no Miranda violation, but even if there was, Mr. Timpson presented
no evidence to overcome the presumption that counsel made a strategic decision not to file the
suppression motion. (R., pp.73-78.) In regard to the Rule 35 claim, the district court stated that
Mr. Timpson failed to support his claim with evidence, as he failed to provide, or identify the
evidence that would have been used to support a Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.78-79.)
Mr. Timpson timely replied to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.81-82.) He
argued that his comments during the interrogation were clear and unequivocal invocations of the
right to counsel. (R., p.81.) He also provided more detail regarding his Rule 35 claim; he
explained that he sent the aforementioned email to his attorney’s investigator, and that the email
provided the following information: he was granted a “trustee” position at the prison and was
working full time as a painter and dry waller; the length of his sentence made him ineligible for
programming at the work center; he had full-time job opportunities awaiting him in Utah and
Idaho; and he had health problems that could be better treated in the community. 3 (R., pp.8182.)
One month later, the court entered an order dismissing the petition in its entirety.
(R., pp.85-99.) With respect to the suppression claim, the district court’s analysis was very
similar to that in its notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.92-98.) With respect to the Rule 35

3

While the PSI in Mr. Timpson’s case referenced some health problems (PSI, p.63.), it is not
clear that these were the same problems he alleged to have referenced in his email. However, the
balance of the referenced information was “new or additional,” as it was not in the PSI. See
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

3

claim, the court noted that while Mr. Timpson’s reply set “forth the grounds for Rule 35 relief
communicated with” counsel, that evidence was not admissible because it was not properly
verified.

(R., p.98.)

Based on this, it held that post-conviction relief was not warranted.

(R., p.98.) But it went on to state that even if it were to consider the grounds for relief, the
information Mr. Timpson presented did “not constitute ‘new or additional information’ which
rendered his sentence excessive.”

(R., p.98.)

It held that Mr. Timpson’s “desire for

programming and new job opportunities do not erase the crimes he committed or the reasoning
behind the sentence this Court issued.” (R., p.99.) Subsequently, the district court entered its
judgment dismissing the petition. (R., p.101.) Mr. Timpson then filed a notice of appeal timely
from the judgment. (R., pp.103-04.) On appeal, Mr. Timpson argues that the district court erred
when it summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition because it should have held an
evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Timpson’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
Rule 35 motion.

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Timpson’s post-conviction petition?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Timpson’s Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Timpson’s petition for two

reasons. First, it erroneously held that Mr. Timpson’s reply to the district court’s notice of intent
to dismiss was not properly verified. Second, it did not apply the correct standard when it held
that the mitigating information Mr. Timpson stated that he sent his attorney to support a Rule 35
motion did not “erase” the crime or show that the original sentence was “excessive.”

B.

The District Court Erred Because It Did Not Apply The Correct Legal Standards When It
Dismissed Mr. Timpson’s Post-Conviction Petition
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.

Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,
678 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 92
(Ct. App. 1992)). “Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 is the
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.” Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271
(citations omitted).

“Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a

preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is
based.” Id. However, “[a]n application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an
ordinary civil action” in that “an application must contain much more than ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).” Id.
Also, “an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting
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evidence is not included with the application.” Id. at 271-72 (citation omitted). “In other words,
the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.” Id. at 272. Thus, a trial court can
summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief, “if it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 701 (Ct. App. 2015).
However, “if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed.” Id. at 702 (citations omitted). Rather, “[i]f a genuine issue of material
fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues.” Id. On
an appeal from an order of summary dismissal, this Court applies the same standards used by the
trial court and considers whether the petitioner asserts facts that, if true, would entitle the
petitioner to relief. Id. (citations omitted). The Court exercises free review over questions of
law. Id. (citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367,
370 (Ct. App. 2001)).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an applicant must show that his
attorney’s performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct. App. 2015).
“To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that his attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. To establish prejudice, the
applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's inadequate performance,
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the outcome of his proceeding before the trial court would have been different.” Hassett v. State,
127 Idaho 313, 316 (Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, Mr. Timpson established that his attorney’s performance was deficient when
he failed to file a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency when Mr. Timpson asked him to do so.
(R., p.9.) This clearly shows that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. With respect to whether Mr. Timpson was prejudiced by his attorney’s
deficient representation, Mr. Timpson presented new information that would have supported a
Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.81-82.) This established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
his trial counsel was ineffective. Therefore, the district court should have held an evidentiary
hearing on the matter.

The district court, however, applied the wrong standards when it

summarily dismissed Mr. Timpson’s petition.
As an initial matter, the district court erred when it held that post-conviction relief was
not warranted because Mr. Timpson’s reply to its notice of intent to dismiss was not properly
verified. (R., p.98.) Although there was apparently a “copy and paste error,” such that the
certificate of verification on his reply referenced an amended petition instead of the reply,
Mr. Timpson clearly verified his statements as true. The date of the certificate and the date of
the notarization all support such a finding; those dates are not the same dates as those on the
certificate of verification for the amended petition. (Compare R., pp.83, 65.) Therefore, it is
clear that Mr. Timpson verified his statements as true.
Further, any other holding would place form over substance. “[T]his Court will not
exalt form over substance.” In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) (citation omitted). And this
kind of error is “best categorized as a defect in form” not substance. State v. Schmierer, 159
Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 166 (2016); see also Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190
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(Ct. App. 2008) (“Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with respect to post-judgment
pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over form, and a mislabeled pleading
will be treated according to its substance.”).

In Schmierer, Mr. Schmierer filed an Idaho

Criminal Rule 35(a) motion alleging that his sentence was illegal because the prosecutor
amended the indictment without resubmitting the matter to the grand jury; instead, the prosecutor
signed the indictment.

Id. at 164.

The district court denied the motion, and on appeal

Mr. Schmierer argued that the charging document was “jurisdictionally defective” because it was
“not issued by the grand jury or endorsed by the foreman of the grand jury.” Id. at 166.
The Idaho Supreme Court held, “[A]fter examining the circumstances of this case, the
Court is left with the abiding belief that the charging document issued was in substance an
information mislabeled as an indictment.”

Id.

It went on to state, “Had the ‘Amended

Superseding Indictment’ been labeled ‘Information,’ there would be no question that it conferred
jurisdiction over the second enticement charge.”

Id.

Then, citing I.C. § 19-1419, which

addresses defects of form in indictments, the Court held, “The fact that the charging document
was entitled ‘true bill’ rather than ‘information’ is best categorized as a defect in form,” which
did not prejudice Mr. Schmierer and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Id.
Analogous to the situation in Schmierer, there is no indication here that the State would
be prejudiced by what was clearly only a clerical error in the certificate of verification on
Mr. Timpson’s reply. And if a mislabeled pleading should be treated according to its substance,
then certainly a certificate of verification should be considered valid if it is clear that the only
problem with the document is a clerical error. Because it is clear that Mr. Timpson signed and
dated the certificate of verification on his reply and thus verified his statements as true, the
district court erred when it held that the reply was not properly verified.

9

The district court also erred by applying an incorrect standard when it held that the new
information Mr. Timpson presented did not “erase the crimes he committed.”

(R., p.99.)

Mitigating evidence does not erase the crime; it does not address guilt or innocence. Rather, it
goes towards the severity of the punishment. A “mitigating circumstance” is defined as “a fact
or situation that does not justify or excuse a wrongful act or offense but that reduces the degree
of culpability and thus may reduce the damages (in a civil case) or the punishment (in a criminal
case).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (9th ed. 2009); see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
284-88 (2004) (defendants do not need to establish a nexus between mitigating information and
the crime). As such, this was not the proper standard to determine whether Mr. Timpson’s Rule
35 motion would have been granted.
More importantly, the district court stated that Mr. Timpson had “the burden of
demonstrating that his sentence was excessive ‘in light of new or additional information.’”
(R., p.98.) And it went to hold that the new information Mr. Timpson provided in the email did
not “render his sentence excessive.” (R., pp.98-99.) It did not have to. The new information
Mr. Timpson provided did not have to show that his original sentence was excessive because that
is not the standard in post-conviction. As referenced above, in post-conviction, the standard for
establishing that counsel’s deficient performance was also prejudicial is whether there is a
“reasonable probability” of a different outcome in light of the evidence. Hassett, 127 Idaho at
316.
Finally, the district court held, “Timpson cannot establish that a Rule 35 motion, if
pursued, would have been granted.” (R., p.99.) Again, Mr. Timpson did not have to establish
his motion would have been granted, only that there was a genuine issue of material fact which,
if resolved in his favor would give rise to a reasonable probability that it would have been. And
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any change in the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors based on the addition of
mitigating evidence necessarily changes a court’s sentencing analysis, and thus creates a
reasonable probability of a different outcome.

See State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 9

(2016), reh’g denied (Apr. 22, 2016) (“[T]he district court considered and weighed all the
relevant factors, which included both mitigating and aggravating factors . . . .”). Therefore, the
district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Timpson’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Timpson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s judgment
dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the
claim that Mr. Timpson’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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